

The watercraft under scrutiny in Lozman was a non- self-propelled, homemade floating structure comprised of a plywood hull with bilge space and a deck capped with a house constructed with land-based materials, including French doors and windows, and containing everyday household appliances. As neither the Vessel Documentation Act nor CIMLA sets forth a different definition, the default definition applies for purposes of determining whether a watercraft is eligible for documentation and imposition of a preferred mortgage. Code, except where a different definition is set forth for a specific purpose. This definition of “vessel,” which is commonly referred to as the default definition, applies throughout the U.S. The word “vessel” includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. In its decision, the Court analyzed the proper factors to consider in applying the definition of “vessel” found in the Rules of Construction Act: 3 City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 1 which examined one of the most fundamental questions in vessel finance – what is a vessel? This decision is of great importance to vessel financiers for many reasons, but perhaps the most important of these reasons is that a watercraft’s status as a “vessel” is critical to its eligibility for documentation and imposition of a preferred mortgage, which is the primary vehicle for financing vessels in the United States and elsewhere in the world.


On January 15, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Lozman v.
